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Abstract
Over the last decade Germany has boosted renewable energy in
power production by means of massive subsidies. The flip side are
very high electricity prices which raises concerns that the transition
cost towards a renewable energy system will be mainly borne by poor
households. In this paper, we combine computable general equilibrium
and microsimulation analysis to investigate the cost-effectiveness and
incidence of Germany’s renewable energy promotion. We find that the
regressive effects of renewable energy promotion could be ameliorated
by alternative subsidy financing mechanisms which achieve the same
level of electricity generation from renewable energy sources.
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1 Introduction
Germany has been a forerunner in the promotion of renewable energy over
the last decade with the outspoken objective to achieve a share of renewable
energy in gross power production of 35% by 2020 and of 80% by 2050. The
central legislation in Germany’s renewable energy policy is the Renewable
Energy Sources Act – the so-called Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (eeg; see
BMWi (2014)). The core element of the eeg are technology-specific feed-in
tariffs (fits) that guarantee purchases of green power at fixed prices over
longer periods. The fits are combined with the system operators’ obligation
to provide connection to the grid and to warrant priority feed-in of electric-
ity from renewable energy sources over electricity from conventional energy
sources. The difference between fits and the (lower) electricity market price
is borne by the electricity consumers via the eeg reallocation charge (rac).
For reasons of international competitiveness, highly electricity-intensive in-
dustries are paying a reduced rac. Over the last ten years the share of
renewable energy in Germany’s gross power production has increased from
around 11% in 2006 to ca. 32% in 2015 – with rapid expansions especially in
wind power, photovoltaic, and biomass. The flip side of the massive expan-
sion of renewable power is the drastic increase of subsidy payments. From
2006 to 2014, the total subsidies almost quadrupled from 5.8 to roughly
21.5 billion Euros. As a consequence, the eeg surcharge on households’
electric bills meanwhile amounted to more than 6 Euro cent/kWh, which
is roughly a quarter of the average household electricity price in Germany
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). The high cost burden has provoked an intense
public debate on the cost-effectiveness and incidence of Germany’s renewable
energy policy. For assessing cost-effectiveness the key question is whether
the subsidy scheme could be changed to achieve the same share of renew-
able power production at lower cost. With incidence the issue is how costs
are spread across different households. In this paper we provide quanti-
tative evidence on both the cost-effectiveness and incidence of Germany’s
renewable energy policy. We investigate how the cost-effectiveness of re-
newable energy promotion could be improved by switching to uniform as
compared to differentiated fits. Regarding cost incidence, we examine how
the abolition of exemptions for electricity-intensive industries or a more
fundamental shift towards value-added financing of green subsidies affect
the burden across households. Clearly, in a broader economic perspective
the efficiency and incidence of policy design are intertwined and potentially
subject to trade-offs. For our quantitative assessment we use a numerical
framework which combines a computable general equilibrium (cge) model
with a microsimulation (ms) model. The advantage of the cge-ms combina-
tion is that we can analyse implications for economy-wide cost-effectiveness
of policy reforms while at the same time provide a very detailed perspective
on household incidence. The integrated modelling framework does not only
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feature a rich representation of household heterogeneity but accounts for im-
portant inter-sectoral linkages and price-dependent market feedbacks across
the whole economy. Another special feature of our modelling framework –
owing to the requirements of technology-specific policy regulations in the
electricity sector – is the bottom-up representation of discrete power gen-
eration technologies within the top-down cge model following the seminal
contributions by Bo¨hringer (1998) and Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2008).
We find that phasing out the exemptions from the rac on electricity
prices for electricity intensive sectors would increase the cost-effectiveness of
the eeg. Yet, replacing the rac by increasing the value-added tax (vat) on
consumption goods would increase cost-effectiveness even further. The vat
financing would also attenuate the adverse incidence on the poorest house-
holds which are particularly hurt under the current policy design. Making
fit uniform across subsidised renewable technologies neither improves on
cost-effectiveness nor on the regressive impacts of renewable energy promo-
tion as long as the distortive rac is in place.
So far, economic analyses of Germany’s renewable energy promotion
largely focused on the implications of the eeg in the context of EU-wide
climate policies. Taking CO2 emission reduction as the major objective of
renewable energy promotion, the eeg has been particularly criticised on the
grounds of missing climate effectiveness. As a matter of fact, CO2 emissions
from the power sector and other energy-intensive industries in Germany and
the rest of the EU are capped through an EU-wide emissions trading system
– the so-called EU ETS. Massive subsidies to renewable power production
will simply reallocate emissions across these EU-ETS sectors while the over-
all compliance cost to the EU-wide emission cap will rise due to costly CO2
emission abatement from excessive expansion of renewable energies and too
little abatement from other (cheaper) mitigation opportunities such as fuel
switching from coal to gas or energy efficiency improvements (Bo¨hringer
et al., 2009; Frondel et al., 2010). Beyond inducing excess cost in climate
policy, the eeg generates potentially undesired shifts in cost incidence across
regions, industries, and technologies. The eeg lowers the demand pressure
on the supply of emission certificates, which depresses the price for CO2
emission allowances. Cross-region and cross-industry carbon ‘leakage’ then
benefits countries that are importers of emission certificates (industries that
purchase emission allowances) and hurts regions that are exporters of emis-
sion certificates (industries that sell emission allowances); likewise the most
CO2-intensive power technologies such as lignite-fired power plants gain a
cost advantage at the expense of non-renewable technologies with lower CO2
intensity such as gas power plants (Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl, 2010). A more
narrow cost-effectiveness perspective on the eeg – which is also adopted in
the current paper – does not question renewable energy targets against the
background of overlapping counterproductive regulation with the EU ETS.
The major point for discussion is rather the re-design of renewable promotion
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policy to make compliance with exogenous renewable targets less costly. In
the absence of technology-specific market failures such as differential knowl-
edge spillover or adoption externalities, economic efficiency suggests expan-
sion of renewable power in a manner that marginal costs of green production
across technologies are equalised. In practise, however, fits as stipulated
in the eeg vary depending on the technology. For instance, electricity gen-
erated from solar power gets remunerated with a much higher price than
electricity generated from wind power. As a result, too much solar power is
being produced and the expansion target for renewable energy is not imple-
mented at least cost. A reform concept proposed by various expert commis-
sions (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011; Monopolkommission, 2013) is to select
renewable power plants eligible for funding through a tendering procedure;
an alternative mechanism would be to switch to tradable green certificates, a
market-based regulatory system that is already in place in various other EU
countries such as Belgium, Sweden, or Poland. Due to the sharp increase in
the rac over the last ten years, the distributional impacts of the eeg have
gained more and more attention. According to a survey by the German
Network Agency, German private consumers rank third in Europe in terms
of electricity prices (Bundesnetzagentur and Bundeskartellamt, 2014). Av-
erage electricity prices for a three-person household have risen from 18.01
Cent/KWh in 2006 by more than 50% to 29.16 Cent/KWh in 2015 with the
subsidies to renewable energy as the main cost driver. Since demand for elec-
tricity is very inelastic, one would assume that low-income households are
burdened to a relatively higher degree than high-income households, yield-
ing regressive effects of the German transition towards renewable energy.1
The regressive effects on the expenditure side may be further strengthened
when accounting who is likely to gain from the renewable energy subsidies
on the income side: Payments emerging from the eeg’s provisions accrue to
owners of rooftop photovoltaic installations or shareholders in wind parks
– these beneficiaries tend to belong to a more aﬄuent segment of society.
Neuhoff et al. (2013) use household micro data to explore the distributional
implications of the eeg. Their analysis confirms that poorer households are
more heavily affected and propose three options for alleviation: lump-sum
transfers, a reduction of electricity taxes, or additional subsidies to improve
energy efficiency. Gro¨sche and Schro¨der (2013) show that the redistributive
effects of the German fit system persist for alternative inequality indices.
Existing literature on the distributional effects of renewable promotion poli-
cies focuses largely on the expenditure (spending) side, i.e., how consumers
are affected by policy-induced price changes given the way they spend their
income. These studies tend to base the incidence analysis on exogenous price
1Note that the fact that electricity-intensive manufacturing companies have to pay only
a reduced eeg rac so as to remain competitive leads to an even greater cost burden for
residual electricity consumers.
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changes or use simple input–output models to gauge the direct and indirect
impacts of policy intervention. Such analyses remain, however, an incom-
plete attempt with respect to assessing the full distributional impacts as they
(i) suppress behavioural responses of consumers, (ii) assume away the role
for price-dependent market interactions, and (iii) do not take into account
how (various components of) consumer income may be affected. To our best
knowledge of the existing literature, our paper is the first that combines an
economy-wide efficiency perspective with a detailed incidence analysis of
the German eeg. A comprehensive and coherent impact assessment is war-
ranted through the combination of computable general equilibrium analysis
with microsimulation analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the numerical framework underlying our quantitative analysis. In
Section 3, we lay out the policy scenarios. In Section 4 we present and
discuss our simulation results. In Section 5, we conclude.
2 Numerical framework
To assess the cost-effectiveness and incidence of Germany’s renewable pro-
motion strategy, we couple a cge model calibrated to German national
input–output accounts with a ms model of German household income and
expenditure. In the following, we describe the cge and ms components
of our modelling framework separately and also lay out the specific data
requirements.
2.1 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
2.1.1 Model summary
Our cge model features a standard static small-open economy representa-
tion of the German economy. The cge approach accommodates counterfac-
tual ex-ante comparisons, assessing the outcomes of changes in policy design
against a business-as-usual reference without the eeg in place. cge mod-
els are rooted in general equilibrium theory combining assumptions on the
optimising behaviour of economic agents with the analysis of equilibrium
conditions: producers employ primary factors and intermediate inputs at
least cost subject to technological constraints; consumers with given pref-
erences maximise their well-being subject to budget constraints. The cge
approach provides a comprehensive microeconomic representation of price-
responsive market interactions and income-expenditure circles. cge analysis
quantifies the changes in key macroeconomic indicators (e.g. gross domestic
product) as well as sector-specific economic activities (e.g. output, export,
import) as compared to a business-as-usual situation. cge analysis does not
only deliver positive information on policy-induced changes in key economic
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indicators at the macroeconomic level, at the sector level and at the house-
hold level; cge analysis also allows for normative rankings of alternative
policy options to achieve some given policy target such as the promotion of
renewable energy.
Below we provide a non-technical description of key model features. A
detailed algebraic exposition of the economic logic is provided in previous
publications such as Bo¨hringer et al. (2005) or Bo¨hringer and Rutherford
(2008).
Production technologies and firm behaviour. Industries pro-
duce gross output (Y) using primary inputs labour (L) and capital (K) and
intermediate inputs of energy (E) and materials (M). Intermediate inputs
are composed of a domestically produced variety and imports.
We employ nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (ces) cost func-
tions to characterise price-responsive trade-offs across inputs in production.
Fig. 1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the nesting structure where
we refer to inputs with their input prices.2 The elasticities of substitution
that govern how easy on commodity can be replaced by another in the
production process are denoted with σ. In the bottom-level nest, labour
and capital are combined in a value-added nest. Value-added is then com-
bined with energy in a ces nest that represents a value-added–energy com-
posite. In the top-level nest, a composite of intermediate material inputs
trades off against the value-added–energy composite at a constant-elasticity-
of-substitution. The composites of energy and material in itself are again
CES aggregates of various energy or material inputs. All industries except
for fuel resource extraction and electricity generation are characterised by
constant-returns-to-scale production functions.
In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs, except for the sector-specific
fossil fuel resource, are aggregated in fixed proportions. This aggregate
trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant elasticity
of substitution.
Given the paramount importance of the electricity sector with respect to
the promotion of renewable power generation the standard top-down repre-
sentation of power production through a ces production (cost) function is
replaced by a bottom-up activity analysis characterisation where several dis-
crete generation technologies produce electricity by combining technology-
specific capital with inputs of labour, fuel, and materials. Electricity from
different technologies is treated as a homogeneous good. Power generation
technologies respond to changes in electricity prices according to technology-
specific supply elasticities (see Rutherford (2002) for details on the cali-
bration technique). In addition, lower and upper bounds on production
capacities can provide explicit limits to the decline and the expansion of
technologies.
2For example, the Armington price for intermediate input i is denoted PAi.
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Figure 1: Cost function in production
Fossil fuel resources and generation capacity to power technologies are
treated as specific capital in fixed supply, whereas capital otherwise is as-
sumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors; likewise labour can move freely
across sectors. Firms operate in perfectly competitive markets and maximise
their profits by selling their products at a price equal to marginal costs.
Preferences and household behaviour. Final consumption de-
mand is determined by a representative agent who maximises welfare sub-
ject to a budget constraint with fixed savings which determines investment
demand. The representative household receives income from net factor earn-
ings and government transfers. The disposable income is then spent across
consumption categories at given prices subject to ces preferences where the
different consumption categories are traded off at a constant elasticity of
substitution. Each consumption category consists of goods produced by
industrial sectors.
Government. The government collects taxes to finance transfers and
the provision of a public good. The public good is produced with commodi-
ties purchased at market prices. Across all policy simulations the level of
public good provision is kept constant in order to assure a meaningful cost-
effectiveness analysis without the need to trade off private consumption and
government (public) consumption. By default, the equal-yield public good
provision is warranted through lump-sum transfers between the government
and households.
International trade. In international trade, Germany is treated as
small relative to the world market. That is, we assume that changes in
German import and export volumes have no effect on its terms of trade.
Domestic and foreign products are distinguished by the Armington assump-
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tion of product heterogeneity (Armington, 1969). On the import side, do-
mestic goods and imported goods of the same variety are combined to a
so-called Armington composite that enters intermediate and final demands.
On the export side, goods destined for domestic and international markets
are treated as imperfect substitutes, produced subject to a constant elas-
ticity of transformation. We impose a constant trade balance with respect
to the rest of the world, accounting for an exogenously specified net trade
surplus which is warranted through an endogenous real exchange rate.
2.1.2 Data
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, benchmark quanti-
ties and prices – together with exogenous elasticities – are used to calibrate
the model. They determine the free parameters of the functional forms that
capture production technologies and consumer preferences.
We use the input–output table of the German federal statistical office
for the year 2006 as the central data source for model calibration. The
choice of 2006 as the base-year for model calibration is motivated by the
fact that renewable energy subsidies under the eeg started to become quite
substantial from 2006 onward. The first quadrant of the input–output table
reports intermediate inputs for each sector. The second quadrant provides
information on final demand components private and public consumption,
investment, inventory changes and exports. Factor payments to labour and
capital (combined with profits in the row ‘operating surplus’) are included
in the third quadrant which also reports the inflows of foreign goods and
services to each production sector. Output by production sector is linked
to consumption by private households in terms of consumption expenditure
categories through the Z-matrix (in German: the so-called ‘Konsumver-
flechtungstabelle’). The electricity sector is decomposed into discrete power
generation technologies according to technology-specific production shares
provided by AG Energiebilanzen e.V. (2016) and input cost shares provided
by Wissel et al. (2008).
Elasticities of substitution for the input structure sketched in Figure 1
are chosen in accordance to empirical estimates by Koesler and Schymura
(2012) and Steinbuks and Narayanan (2015). The elasticities of substitution
in fossil fuel sectors are calibrated to match exogenous estimates of fossil-
fuel supply elasticities (Graham et al., 1999; Krichene, 2002). The price
elasticities of electricity supply by technologies are calibrated to match the
changes in power generation shares across technologies following the massive
subsidies to renewables over the period between 2006 and 2014 (see scenario
diffracx in Section 3).
Table 1 provides an overview of sectors, consumption categories and
power generation technologies that are explicitly represented in our cge
model.
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Table 1: Overview of sectors, consumption categories, and power generation
technologies
Set Elements
Sectors (i ∈ I)
Fossil fuel supply Crude oil (cru), Coal mining(coal), Natural gas (gas)
Electricity Electric power generation (epg), Transmission & distribution (ele)
Production sectors Manufacturing (man), Energy-intensive sectors (ein),
Agriculture and food (agr), Other mining (min), Services (ser),
Transport (trp), Refined oil prodcuts (oil)
Consumption categories Food, Housing, Electricity, Heating, Transport,
(c ∈ C) Education and leisure, Other non-durable goods and services,
Durables
Electricity generation Hydro, Gas, Nuclear, Solar, Wind, Biomass
technologies (et ∈ ET )
2.2 Microsimulation (MS) model
The core of the microsimulation model is the well established Almost Ideal
Demand System (aids) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The mi-
cro data ‘Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe’ (evs) is used to compute
the parameters from the aids which are used to simulate demand responses
of households. As is the case for the representative household in the cge
model, each household in the ms model is represented by their fixed factor
endowments from which they receive income, their fixed savings decision,
and their spending of disposable income across consumption categories of
the model.
2.2.1 Model summary
The aids assumes an expenditure function e(~p, u) which is homogeneous of
degree one in prices3 and from which the following system of budget share
can be obtained after applying Shephard’s lemma:
θi = αi +
∑
j
γij log pj + βi log
m
P
, (1)
3The estimated parameters follow the standard constraints for homogeneity
∑
i αi = 1
and
∑
i γij =
∑
j γij =
∑
i βi = 0.
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where θi, pi, m denote expenditure shares, commodity prices and total ex-
penditures. P is a price index given by
logP = α0 +
∑
i
αi log pi +
1
2
∑
i,j
γi,j log pi log pj , (2)
In our empirical specification, the parameters γi,j and βi are specific for
each of seven household groups. The groups discern between households of
different size and age. Moreover, αi is allowed to change across dwelling and
demographic characteristics (see Blundell et al., 1993). The system is then
estimated employing the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Zellner, 1962).
The estimated parameters related to price and income changes are statisti-
cal significant and displayed in the Appendix in Table 12.4 Regarding the
aggregation categories used in the demand system, we create the commod-
ity groups as described in Table 11.5 Changes in commodity prices and
income simulated by the cge model are passed to the aids system through
the terms pi and m. The equilibrium prices are used to estimate P as de-
fined in equation (2). These values are then used to compute our metric of
equivalent variation (ev) which in analogy to Creedy and Sleeman (2006),
is derived as follows:
EV
m¯
=
(
P¯
m¯
)
exp
[∏
i
(
p¯i
pi
)βi
log
(m
P
)]
− 1, (3)
where p¯i and m¯ are the reference price levels and total expenditure. More-
over, we use Atkinson’s index (Atkinson, 1970) to quantify the trade-off
between efficiency and equity (e.g., mean equivalent income and its distri-
bution across households) which is defined as follows:
Social Welfare =
∑
h (Yno-policy,h + EVh)
√
hsizeh∑
h hsizeh︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean equivalent income (MEI)
×(1−A), (4)
where Yno-policy is total household expenditure in the no-policy situation (in
our case the base-year equilibrium), hsize is household size, and A is Atkin-
son’s inequality index at a given level of the inequality aversion parameter
 (see e.g. King, 1983).
2.2.2 Data
The aids is estimated using the “survey of income and expenditure (evs)”
for Germany which provides information on expenditure across different
4For the econometric estimation, we follow standard practise by approximating price
index P by using the Stone index.
5We also estimated own price and income elasticities for these commodities. They are
statistical significant and consistent with economic theory. The estimates are available
upon request for interested readers.
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commodities, income, and other socioeconomic variables. The survey is car-
ried out every five years. We use the waves 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013
for the econometric estimation and only the wave 2008 (closest to 2006, the
year the input-output table for the cge model refers to) for the microsim-
ulation exercise. Regarding prices, we use Lewbel (1989)’s methodology to
obtain household specific prices by combining the micro data and prices re-
ported by the German Statistical Office. Table 10 in the Appendix provides
mean and standard deviation of the variables used in the estimation.
2.3 Linkage of CGE and MS models
The coupling approach follows the decomposition method by Rutherford
and Tarr (2008). It uses the cge model which represents households by one
single representative household in order to evaluate impacts of given policies
on market prices for consumer goods and production factors. The ms model
then takes these prices as given and calculates first household income and
then household consumption at the given prices. The representative house-
hold in the cge model is then recalibrated such that it reproduces aggregate
consumption according to the ms model at present prices. This creates new
imbalances in the markets for the consumption goods. By repeatedly re-
solving the top-down model and reevaluating the ms model at new market
prices the two models converge the solution of the overall model.
In order to achieve a tight link between the cge model and the ms model,
we need the aggregate incomes and consumption demands of households in
the ms model to agree with the corresponding numbers in the cge model.
The survey data used in the ms model comes with statistical weights that
indicate how many of Germany’s households one household in the survey
represents. This lets us determine aggregate consumption and income from
survey data but this will not agree with national accounts in the Z-matrix.
To achieve the required match, we scaled up households’ total expenditures
from the survey to match total household expenditure according to national
accounts. In order to cleanly implement the aids, it is imperative that
we leave expenditure shares as they are in the survey. Thus, differences in
national household expenditures on a commodity basis have to be compen-
sated in the cge model. We shifted the residual demands to government
consumption to achieve this.
On the income side, we scaled capital and labour income in the ms
model by factors uniform across all households. Lacking information about
savings from the survey, we distribute saving decisions among households
in proportion to their capital income. The residual between expenditure,
savings, and factor income was then allocated to government transfers.
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3 Scenarios
The reference scenario for our economic impact assessment is established
by the design of Germany’s renewable promotion policy as mandated under
the eeg: (i) there are fits that vary substantially across renewable tech-
nologies, and (ii) the difference between the electricity market price and the
technology-specific fits is financed by a rac across electricity consumers
with electricity-intensive industries paying only a fraction of the nominal
rac.6
In our simulation analysis we investigate how the cost magnitude and
cost distribution of renewable promotion policy change as we change the
eeg prescriptions along two dimensions. The first dimension refers to the
cost-effectiveness of renewable subsidies. Instead of providing differentiated
fits,7 one could postulate uniform subsidies in order to equalise marginal
cost of renewable expansion across technologies. The second dimension re-
flects concerns on distributional impacts of the rac: To avoid discrimina-
tion across electricity consumers, one would at least postulate electricity-
intensive sectors to pay the full rac; alternatively, one might abolish the
rac and switch to a financing of the renewable energy subsidies by broader
based value-added taxation.
We distinguish renewable promotion policy scenarios with respect to
tariff design (differentiated (labelled diff-) versus uniform (labelled uni-)
and the financing of subsidy payments (reallocation charge with exemptions
(labelled -racx), rac without exemptions (labelled -rac), or VA tax (la-
belled -vat)). In total, we obtain six scenarios with acronyms as provided
in Table 2. Note that scenario diffracx most closely reflects the current
design the eeg and represents the reference against which we try to find
improvements.
Table 2: Scenario overview
differentiated rac uniform rac VA tax
uniform fit uniracx unirac diffvat
differentiated fit diffracx diffrac univat
Across all renewable promotion scenarios, we keep the electricity gener-
ation from renewable energy sources at the level of scenario diffracx to
accommodate a coherent cost-effectiveness analysis of alternative policy de-
signs. The economic impacts of renewable promotion are measured against
6The eeg allows firms that use more than 1 GWh of electric power per annum and spend
more on electricity than 14 percent of their value-added to apply for reduced rates. Annual
electricity demand beyond 1 GWh is then charged a lower rac with further reductions
for demand beyond 10 GWh and 100 GWh.
7In 2014 the average fits amounted to roughly 34 Euro cents per kWh for photovoltaics,
20 Euro cents per kWh for biofuels, and 13 Euro cents per kWh for wind power.
11
a no-policy scenario which we take as the 2006 base-year equilibrium before
the massive penetration of renewable energy into the power system started.
In the our scenario analysis, we abstain from any other policy regulations
– such as the EU ETS – but focus in our assessment on the impacts of
renewable energy promotion.
4 Results
We start the discussion of simulation results with electricity market effects.
Changes in electricity prices induced by alternative policy design constitute
a driver of economic impacts at the sector level – in particular for electricity-
intensive industries. We then assess the cost-effectiveness of policy reforms
from the perspective of a representative agent neglecting any details and
concerns on cost distribution. The incidence of renewable energy promotion
policies across different households is discussed in Section 4.4.
If not mentioned otherwise, all results are reported in percentage change
from the no-policy benchmark.
4.1 Electricity market effects
Table 3 shows the effects of policies on electricity generation. The producer
price of electricity for conventional power sources corresponds to the mar-
ket rate for electricity generation, while the renewable power sources wind,
biomass, and photovoltaics (PV) receive fit payments that are higher than
that. Overall power generation changes little between the different scenarios
that finance the fit with a rac. Only if the fit is financed by a value-added
tax, does electricity generation increase due to a demand side effect from
lower consumer prices. Consumer prices of electricity vary considerably in
scenarios in which rac has exemptions (uniracx and diffracx). The
average rac rate that different electricity consumers pay are given in the
fourth section of Table 3. The total volume of rac payments necessary for
reaching the targeted renewable energy sources (res) generation in electric-
ity generation is given in the last row and increases somewhat for scenarios
in which the fit is uniform.8
4.2 Industry-specific effects
The exemptions to the rac have been made in order to preserve interna-
tional competitiveness of electricity-intensive industries. Our results indeed
indicate that abolishing the exemptions would indeed hurt those industries
(see Table 4): They produce less and export less under scenarios diffrac
8Fischer (2010) shows that promotion of renewable energy sources in electricity gener-
ation can have ambiguous effects on electricity prices and that the effects depend on the
price elasticities of supply across technologies.
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Table 3: Impacts on electricity production
diffRACX uniRACX diffRAC uniRAC diffVAT uniVAT
Producer price of electricity [EUR per MWh]
Market rate 42.3 41.8 42.6 42.0 50.7 50.6
Wind 128.0 214.5 127.9 214.4 131.2 220.0
Biomass 201.0 214.5 200.9 214.4 206.1 220.0
PV 336.0 214.5 335.8 214.4 344.5 220.0
Generation [TWh]
Conventional 502.3 499.0 501.7 498.3 553.5 552.9
Wind 56.5 61.9 56.5 61.9 56.3 61.8
Biomass 42.7 43.8 42.7 43.8 42.5 43.5
PV 35.5 29.1 35.5 29.1 35.3 28.8
Other RES 23.3 23.3 23.4 23.3 24.0 23.9
Consumer price of electricity [EUR per MWh]
Coal mining 107.5 107.7 153.6 157.4 106.2 106.1
Gas 129.2 131.1 153.6 157.4 106.2 106.1
EIS 136.7 139.2 153.6 157.4 106.2 106.1
Other mining 127.1 128.8 153.6 157.4 106.2 106.1
Other industries 156.7 160.7 153.6 157.4 106.2 106.1
Households 160.0 164.3 153.6 157.4 106.2 106.1
Average RAC [EUR per MWh]
Coal mining 14 15 59 64
Gas 35 38 59 64
EIS 43 46 59 64
Other mining 33 36 59 64
Other industries 63 68 59 64
Households 66 71 59 64
RAC payments [Billion EUR]
National 22.0 23.3 22.0 23.2
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and unirac than under scenarios diffracx and uniracx. But it is the
scenarios that finance the fit through an increase in value-added taxes that
would constitute the biggest boon for the electricity-intensive industries.
Their output in these scenarios shrinks only by little, if at all, and their
exports even increase compared to the no-policy scenario. Sectors react
to changes in electricity prices by adjusting their electricity intensity9 (see
fourth part of Table 4). This results in lower electricity intensities in sce-
narios that finance the fit through a rac. If the fit is financed through
a value-added tax, electricity intensities tend to increase compared to the
no-policy case.
Table 4: Impacts on industries (% change from no-policy).
diffRACX uniRACX diffRAC uniRAC diffVAT uniVAT
Output
Coal mining -15.48 -16.27 -19.71 -20.77 -2.97 -3.06
Natural gas -5.48 -5.77 -6.56 -6.92 -0.53 -0.48
EIN -6.23 -6.72 -10.47 -11.18 0.59 0.59
Other mining -6.15 -6.66 -12.19 -13.03 0.80 0.80
Electricity 0.33 -0.31 0.31 -0.34 10.50 10.39
Other industries -6.15 -6.66 -12.19 -13.03 0.80 0.80
Imports
Coal mining -31.95 -33.38 -29.31 -30.59 -6.92 -7.16
EIN -1.66 -1.77 -2.05 -2.17 -0.08 -0.08
Other mining -4.34 -4.65 -5.99 -6.38 0.17 0.18
Electricity -53.94 -56.46 -53.27 -55.76 -3.62 -4.23
Other industries -0.53 -0.59 -0.93 -1.01 0.23 0.24
Exports
Coal mining 2.49 2.58 -10.02 -10.83 0.74 0.78
EIN -7.82 -8.45 -13.36 -14.26 0.82 0.83
Other mining -7.42 -8.08 -16.41 -17.53 1.25 1.25
Electricity 69.02 72.80 67.55 71.17 22.30 22.66
Other industries -0.34 -0.34 0.58 0.63 -0.34 -0.35
Electricity intensity of output
Coal mining -3.87 -4.09 -5.02 -5.31 -0.71 -0.73
Natural gas -1.89 -1.99 -2.25 -2.36 -0.19 -0.18
EIN -11.10 -11.94 -16.27 -17.31 1.42 1.47
Other mining -7.40 -8.03 -15.55 -16.54 1.32 1.38
Other industries -4.55 -5.93 -4.23 -5.59 10.65 10.15
4.3 Cost-effectiveness
While sector performance is an important indicator to the economic im-
pact assessment of policy changes, it provides just a partial perspective.
The more general (equilibrium) view investigates the economic implications
across households for ranking policy scenarios. Households are affected on
9Electricity intensity is the electricity consumption per e of output.
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the income side through changes in wage and capital earnings (reflecting
policy-induced shift in the marginal productivity of primary factors) and
on the expenditure side through change in price for consumption goods.
Table 5 provides an overview of policy-induced changes in consumer prices
and factor remuneration. It can be seen that if the fit is financed by a
rac, consumer prices for electricity go up considerably while other prices
slightly drop. If the fit is financed by a uniform value-added tax, this tax
tends to increase consumer prices almost uniformly, while the fit depresses
consumer electricity prices somewhat compared to the no-policy case. On
the income side, average rents on capital resources and technology specific
factors increase (especially so for scenarios where the fit is financed through
a vat) while wages decrease for scenarios with a rac and increase (but less
so) for scenarios that finance the fit through a value-added tax.
Table 5: Impacts on consumer and factor prices (% change from no-policy)
diffRACX uniRACX diffRAC uniRAC diffVAT uniVAT
Consumption goods
Food 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 1.86 1.96
Education -0.30 -0.32 -0.46 -0.50 1.90 2.00
and leisure
Electricity 46.68 50.64 40.85 44.27 -0.83 -0.83
Heating -1.21 -1.26 -1.09 -1.13 1.69 1.81
Other housing -0.36 -0.39 -0.53 -0.57 1.90 2.01
Transportation -0.19 -0.21 -0.33 -0.35 1.90 2.01
Other goods -0.30 -0.32 -0.46 -0.49 1.90 2.01
and services
Durable goods -0.15 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29 1.90 2.01
Income factors
Wages -0.82 -0.91 -0.95 -1.05 0.26 0.25
Capital rents -0.61 -0.62 -0.80 -0.82 -0.19 -0.16
Resource rents -14.55 -15.27 -16.40 -17.21 -1.83 -1.77
Technology rents 72.42 83.29 72.70 83.57 102.23 114.68
Average rents 0.45 0.60 0.26 0.40 1.41 1.63
The overall effect on the representative German households in terms
of equivalent income (ei)10 can be found in the fourth column of Table 6.
This measure indicates that the German population bears the lowest cost
of renewable energy promotion for the case that a uniform fit is financed
through a value-added tax – thus scenario univat turns out to be the most
cost-effective design across our policy variants for promoting renewable en-
ergy in power production. As expected, abolishing exemptions in the current
rac is increasing cost-effectiveness of renewable energy promotion. But
making fit uniform across promoted technologies unexpectedly decreases
10Equivalent income denotes the amount of money that households would need to afford
a scenario’s utility level of consumption at prices of the no-policy scenario.
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Table 6: Inequality and social welfare changes estimated with expression (4)
and the inequality aversion parameter  = 1.2.
AI ∆ AI (%) EI ∆ EI (%) SW ∆ SW (%)
diffRACX 0.109 1.251 1231.715 -1.601 1097.599 -1.749
uniRACX 0.109 1.469 1231.176 -1.644 1096.829 -1.818
diffRAC 0.109 1.238 1233.005 -1.498 1098.765 -1.645
uniRAC 0.109 1.454 1232.566 -1.533 1098.088 -1.706
diffVAT 0.107 -0.440 1246.378 -0.430 1112.932 -0.377
uniVAT 0.107 -0.339 1247.109 -0.371 1113.448 -0.331
Atkinson Index (AI), Equivalent income (EI), Social Welfare (SW)
cost-effectiveness as long as tariffs are financed by a rac. While promoting
res for electricity generation with fits is most efficient if the tariffs are
uniform across technologies, it also entails a decrease in the market rate for
electricity generation and an increase in the volume of fit payments (see
first and last rows in Table 3) compared to the differentiated fit. Because
the fit is financed using a distortionary mark-up on consumer prices of elec-
tricity, this entails additional efficiency costs. It can be observed that while
electricity generation contracts slightly, net exports of electric power increase
and thus domestic electricity consumption decreases. From the perspective
of the representative households’ welfare, the more expensive electricity does
more harm than the rents earned in electricity generation do good.
The cost-effectiveness analysis so far has been based on a mean ei metric
for the representative household taking a Benthamite perspective which ne-
glects the distribution of costs across household types with different income
levels. Modifying mean ei by the Atkinson index yields a social welfare func-
tion that values gains in ei by poor households higher than it does gains in
ei of rich households depending on the assumed degree of inequality aver-
sion. The first column of Table 6 gives the Atkinson index for an inequality
aversion parameter  = 1.211 and column six displays the resulting change in
social welfare (SW) vis-a`-vis the no-policy scenario. Note that social welfare
and ei have similar relative changes (see columns four and six of Table 6)
and (incidentally) their ranking for the analysed scenarios is the same. This
is due to the fact that the Atkinson index only changes by small amounts
between the scenarios that use a rac for financing the promotion of res.
If the fit is financed through a vat, the Atkinson index actually improves
against the no-policy scenario, which makes the most cost-effective scenario
univat also most desirable from a distributional perspective.
11Creedy and Sleeman (2006) use  = 0.2 and  = 1.2. Our choice of  seems to be a
reasonable upper bound for the inequality aversion parameter, even though Pirttila¨ and
Uusitalo (2010) suggest that under certain circumstances, even higher values of  may
apply.
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4.4 Cost incidence across households
Our combined cge-ms model puts us in the comfortable situation of having
welfare functions for each household included in the ms model. Thus we
can not only evaluate the Atkinson index to account for inequality aversion,
but we can analyse how different household types are affected by alterna-
tive policy options. Table 7 displays the estimated mean ev relative to
total expenditure across expenditure quartiles. Comparison of the first and
fourth quartile indicates that when the fit is financed through a rac, poor
households suffer disproportionately more. For scenarios that finance the
fit through an increase in vat, the situation for the poorest quartile actu-
ally improves compared to the no-policy scenario, which is in line with the
decrease in the Atkinson index discussed above.
Table 7: Equivalent variation estimates in % of total expenditure
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
diffRACX -1.87 -1.81 -1.56 -1.15
uniRACX -1.97 -1.87 -1.58 -1.13
diffRAC -1.76 -1.70 -1.46 -1.05
uniRAC -1.85 -1.76 -1.47 -1.02
diffVAT 0.02 -0.43 -0.63 -0.44
uniVAT 0.06 -0.38 -0.56 -0.35
In order to assess how different policy scenarios affect vulnerable house-
holds with different income sources, Table 8 shows average ev for households
where the household head does not have a job12 (column 2) or is a blue-collar
worker (column 3). The fact that wage income fares worse than capital and
resource rents under the policy scenarios causes employed working age house-
holds to loose the highest share of their income. On the expenditure side,
tenants and occupants of old dwellings may be more vulnerable to increases
in energy costs because the buildings they occupy tend to be less energy effi-
cient (see e.g. Rehdanz, 2007). The results in columns four and five suggest
that tenants are indeed vulnerable to the policies analysed here. But the
fact that the decrease in electricity prices in scenarios diffvat and univat
brings less relief to these two types than to other households suggests that
income effects are at least as important for them as are expenditure effects.13
12This includes disabled, retired, and unemployed householders.
13We also estimate mean ev across households with different composition. In addition,
we compute the relative frequency of households with the largest and smallest welfare
losses. The results are displayed in Table 9 in the Appendix.
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Table 8: Monthly equivalent variation for vulnerable households (e)
Jobless Blue-collar Tenants Occupants of
Workers old dwellings
diffRACX -20.64 -38.73 -30.54 -24.30
uniRACX -21.08 -41.22 -32.36 -22.53
diffRAC -19.14 -36.37 -28.60 -22.47
uniRAC -19.47 -38.69 -30.27 -20.52
diffVAT 15.42 -17.27 -17.58 -21.77
uniVAT 17.37 -17.88 -18.09 -18.86
5 Conclusions
We have coupled a microsimulation model that employs the Almost Ideal De-
mand System (aids) for representing household demand with a computable
general equilibrium (cge) model to investigate the cost-effectiveness and
incidence of renewable energy promotion policies in Germany.
Our simulation analysis indicates substantial scope for improving on the
cost-effectiveness of Germany’s policy regulation. While phasing out exemp-
tions from the reallocation charge (rac) would reduce the economy-wide
costs of the German eeg by around 5 percent, replacing the rac by in-
creased value-added taxes would cut the eeg’s efficiency cost by more than
two thirds. Making the fit uniform across promoted technologies, surpris-
ingly, does not have the expected beneficial effects in the context of a rac.
This is due to increasing inefficiency of rising rac rates under such scenarios.
From a distributional perspective, replacing the rac by higher value-
added taxes also turns out to be attractive since the poorest households
benefit. The Atkinson index (a measure of social welfare that includes in-
equality across the nation) also points to a vat based subsidy financing as
the most favourable policy design among those investigated in this paper.
Our analysis looks at the efficiency cost of introducing targets for elec-
tricity generation from renewable energy sources (res) at given world market
prices for fossil fuels without accounting for potential benefits from such pro-
motion of res. Our counterfactual scenarios keep the power generation by
res constant in order to warrant a coherent cost-effectiveness comparison.
Our analysis cannot, however, judge if it is worthwhile to have a res target
for the national power sector in the first place. The economic compliance
cost to such targets must be balanced against potential economic benefits
arising from increased energy security or spillover effects from technology
innovation.
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A Additional results
Table 9: Monthly welfare losses and portion of household with larger
and smaller losses (ranked equivalent variation)
Mean EV (e) Largest losses (%) Smallest losses(%)
Scenario: diffRACX
Single +65 -15.65 5.66 37.06
Single no children -20.24 21.36 22.36
Single with children -20.13 9.81 14.34
2 adults +65 no children -20.55 16.66 15.52
2 adults no children -29.39 47.00 10.61
2 adults one child -27.46 38.83 8.86
2 adults two children -25.31 34.29 9.99
Scenario: uniRACX
Single +65 -15.96 5.40 36.88
Single no children -21.20 22.49 21.75
Single with children -21.34 9.99 13.14
2 adults +65 no children -20.70 15.57 17.27
2 adults no children -30.60 46.89 11.26
2 adults one child -28.72 39.02 9.23
2 adults two children -26.03 34.08 10.32
Scenario: diffRAC
Single +65 -14.49 5.59 37.83
Single no children -18.79 21.56 23.48
Single with children -18.61 9.62 16.00
2 adults +65 no children -18.98 16.14 16.22
2 adults no children -27.35 47.12 10.99
2 adults one child -25.58 39.06 9.27
2 adults two children -23.44 34.13 10.20
Continued on next page
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Table 9: (continued) Monthly welfare losses
Mean EV (e) Largest losses (%) Smallest losses(%)
Scenario: UniRAC
Single +65 -14.72 5.33 37.90
Single no children -19.66 22.59 22.73
Single with children -19.72 10.18 14.71
2 adults +65 no children -19.01 15.00 17.93
2 adults no children -28.42 47.09 11.60
2 adults one child -26.71 39.06 9.60
2 adults two children -24.03 33.92 10.44
Scenario: diffVAT
Single +65 13.19 0.37 75.70
Single no children -9.04 34.51 9.14
Single with children 0.32 3.79 6.38
2 adults +65 no children 15.09 0.33 87.61
2 adults no children -14.86 42.14 10.51
2 adults one child -10.47 28.76 2.55
2 adults two children -8.63 18.38 1.86
Scenario: UniVAT
Single +65 14.77 0.37 73.68
Single no children -8.99 35.22 8.86
Single with children 0.56 3.98 5.27
2 adults +65 no children 17.34 0.22 87.75
2 adults no children -14.64 41.94 11.07
2 adults one child -10.27 29.01 2.66
2 adults two children -7.90 18.10 2.26
B Supplementary statistics
Table 10: Summary statistics, rounded to the depicted num-
ber of digits
Individualized consumer prices Mean Std. Dev.
food 82.900 19.074
housing 76.579 27.04
electricity 75.697 19.67
heating 24.513 10.424
transport 52.318 17.991
education 79.516 17.819
others 68.452 13.281
durables 50.066 17.188
Household economic variables
Budget share for food 0.18 0.07
Budget share for housing 0.27 0.09
Budget share for electricity 0.03 0.01
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Table 10: (continued) Summary statistics
Budget share for heating 0.04 0.03
Budget share for transport 0.06 0.03
Budget share for education 0.08 0.07
Budget share for others 0.25 0.09
Budget share for durables 0.10 0.11
Total expenditure 9627.25 5002.45
Dwelling and households characteristics
Central heating (dummy) 0.73 0.44
District heating (dummy) 0.17 0.38
Built before 1948 (dummy) 0.18 0.39
Building date 1949 - 1990 (dummy) 0.53 0.50
Living space in m2 99.52 40.64
Tenant (dummy) 0.49 0.50
Below 20k inhabitants (dummy) 0.11 0.32
20k-100k inhabitants (dummy) 0.20 0.40
Jobless households (dummy) 0.29 0.46
Workers (dummy) 0.13 0.33
Heating degree days 258.89 130.51
Number of observations 128,254
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Table 11: Goods categories and classification of individual consumption by
purpose (COICOP) codes
Main category Subcategories COICOP classification
Food Food, alcohol, tobacco 01, 02
Housing Rent, imputed rent, water,
trash, and other housing
costs
041 - 044
Electricity Electricity 0451
Heating Solid fuels, liquid fuels,
district heating, natural
gas
0452 - 0455
Transport Private and public trans-
portation
07(only 0722 and 073)
Education Education, recreation and
culture
09 (only 093-096), 10
Durable goods Furniture, tools and do-
mestic appliances
051-056, 091-092
Other goods Clothing, health, commu-
nications, restaurants and
hotels, other goods
03, 06, 08, 11, 12
See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=5
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Table 12: Almost Ideal Demand System as specified in Equation (1), esti-
mated as a seemingly unrelated regression, estimates rounded to 3 digits.
Dependent variable: budget share for ...
food housing electricity heating transport education durables
log(p food) 0.028 -0.030 -0.002 -0.009 -0.006 -0.026 0.015
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
log(p housing) -0.030 0.031 -0.004 -0.002 -0.012 -0.000 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
log(p electricity) -0.002 -0.004 0.015 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
log(p heating) -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 -0.004 -0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(p transport) -0.006 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 0.025 0.001 -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(p education) -0.026 -0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 0.044 -0.017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
log(p durables) 0.015 0.006 -0.000 0.003 -0.007 -0.017 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log(M/P) -0.025 -0.107 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012 0.002 0.113
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Central heating -0.018 0.009 -0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.010 -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
District heating -0.016 0.007 -0.007 0.012 -0.006 0.011 -0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Building: 1948 -0.006 -0.053 0.002 0.006 0.002 -0.017 0.049
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Building:1949-1990 -0.010 -0.037 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.020 0.044
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Dwelling size -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenant 0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.002 0.000* 0.004 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Below 20k inh -0.013 -0.019 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.020 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
20k-100k inh -0.015 -0.012 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.028 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Jobless 0.018 0.013 0.003 0.005 -0.010 -0.006 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Workers 0.018 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.009 0.011
HDD 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
constant 0.367 0.652 0.070 0.106 0.136 0.078 -0.405
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
R-squared 0.275 0.443 0.222 0.139 0.137 0.171 0.214
N 128,254
Household specific parameters for prices and expenditure are available upon request
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